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An existence theorem of maximal elements in a non-compact set for 
6P*-majorized correspondences is obtained. Next an existence theorem of an equi- 
librium in a qualitative game is proved and is then applied to achieve an existence 
theorem of equilibrium in a non-compact abstract economy with Y*-majorired 
preference correspondences. These results are either very closely related to or 
generalizations of those recent results of Borglin-Kciding. Yannelis-Prabhakar, 
Toussaint. and Tulcea. ‘1. 1992 Academic Prers. Inc. 
1. INTRODU~TI~N 
The notions of correspondences of class 2pH*, YiOQ-majorant of 4 at I and 
LPz-majorized correspondences are first introduced. An existence theorem 
of maximal elements in a non-compact set for PLpB-majorized corresponden- 
ces is obtained which is applied to prove an existence theorem of equi- 
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librium in a qualitative game. Using the last result, we prove an existence 
theorem of equilibrium in a non-compact abstract economy with 
6P*-majorized preference correspondences. This result generalizes [7. 
p. 242, Theorem 6.11 in several ways and is closely related to the theorems 
of [4, p. 102-103; 6, p. 283). 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
Let A be a subset of a topological space A’. We shall denote by 2’1 the 
family of all subsets of A and by clX A the closure of A in X. If .4 is a subset 
of a vector space, we shall denote by con A the convex hull of ‘4. Let E be 
a topological vector space; if A is a non-empty subset of E, we shall write 
cl A = cl, A and if S, T: A + 2E are correspondences, then con T, cl T, 
Tn S: A + 2E are correspondences defined by (con T)(s) = con T(s), 
(cl T)(x) = cl T(.u) and (Tn S)(.u) = T(s) n S(s) for each XE A, respec- 
tively. 
Let X be a topological space, Y be a non-empty subset of a vector space 
E, 0: X+ E be a map and d: X+2’ be a correspondence. Then (1) 4 is 
said to be of cluss YB if for every x E X, con d(s) c Y and B(X) I$ con d(s) 
and for each YE Y, 4-‘(y)= {~EX:J’E~(I)), is open in X; (2) a corre- 
spondence CJS~: X -+ 2’ is said to be an 40d-mqjorant of 4 at .Y if there exists 
an open neighborhood N, of x in X such that (a) for each ZEN,.. 
~$(:)cd,(:) and @~)$cond,(~), (b) for each ZEX, cond.J=)C Y and 
(c) for each J’E Y, q5 ;‘(.I*) is open in X; (3) c$ is Yz-nzajorixi if for each 
.Y E X with I$(.u) # a, there exists an d;p,*-majorant of 4 at s. 
In view of [7, p. 239, Lemma 5. l] our notions of the correspondence 4 
being of class ypH* or Y,*-majorized generalize the notions C$ E ??(X, Y, 0) or 
V-majorized respectively which were introduced by Tulcea [S, p. 23. We 
shall point out that our map 8: X + E is less restrictive than that of Tulcea 
[S], where 0: X-t Y. In most applications, either (I) X and Y are non- 
empty subsets of the same topological vector space E and Q(.u) = .Y for all 
XEX, or (II) X=JJitl Xi and 0(s)=7rj(.x) for all SEX, where rrj:X+X, 
is the projection of X onto X, and X, and Y are non-empty subsets of the 
same topological vector space E. 
We remark here that when A’= Y and is convex (and 8(x) =s for all 
x E X), the notion of correspondence of class Ug coincides with the notion 
of correspondence of class .J%’ introduced by Yannelis-Prabhakar [7] and 
the notions of YB-majorant of 4 at s and Y,*-majorized correspondence 
generalize the notions of Y-majorant of C$ at x and Y-majorized corre- 
spondence respectively also introduced by Yannelis-Prabhakar [7]. In the 
special case (I), where 8 = 1 ,y the identity map on X or (II), where 0 = rr,. 
we shall write -F* in place of .Ff if there is no ambiguity. 
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It should be noted that if 4 is Y,$-majorized, then for all <YE X, 
I!?(X) r$ con 4(x) and con 4(x) c Y. 
3. EXISTENCE OF MAXIMAL ELEMENTS 
We shall first prove the following useful result: 
LEMMA 1. Let X be a regular topological space and Y be a non-empty 
subset of a vector space E, Let 8: X + E and P: X + 2’ be 9$-majorized. If 
every open subset of X containing the set {x E X : P(x) # a} is paracompact, 
then there exists a correspondence I$: X + 2’ of class 9’: such that 
P(x) c 4(x) for all x E X. 
Proof Let B = { ?c E X : P(x) # Qr }. Since P is 9:-majorized, for each 
x E B, let N, be an open neighborhood of x in X and 4,: X + 2’ be such 
that (i) P(z) c 4,.(z) and e(z) $ con #Jz) for all z E N,, (ii) con $.Jz) c Y 
for all z E X and (iii) ~$;‘(y) is open in X for each y E Y. Since the set 
{zEX:~,(Z)Z0}=U,..~~.,‘(~ 1 r is an open neighborhood of x in X and 
X is regular, there exists an open neighborhood G, of x in X such that 
cl, G, c N, and dx(-7) # 0 for all z E cl, G,. Let G = U.reB G,; then G is 
an open subset of X which contains B = {x E X : P(x) # @} so that G is 
paracompact by assumption. By [3, p. 162, Theorem VIII.1.4] the open 
covering {G,) of G has an open precise neighborhood-finite refinement 
{G:}. For each xEB, define &:G+2Yby 
/J;(z) = { $(Z)T 
5 
If i’, ;,y-$p 
L ,X-V’ 
We claim that for each y E Y, (4:) ~ i (y) = {z E G : y E #k(z) 1 is open in X. 
Indeed, for each y E Y, we have 
(q&-’ (y)= {z~Gncl,G: : y~fJz)}u {zEG\clxGI,:yE~:(z)} 
={z~Gncl,G::y~~,(~)}u{z~G\cl~G::y~Y} 
= [(G~cl,Gk)n~.;‘(~)lu (Gicl,C) 
= (G n 4,‘(y)) u (Wc1.r GI). 
Since 4.; i(y) is open in X, (4:) - ‘( y) is open in X. 
Now we define 4: X+2’by 
n &AZ), if ZEG, 
if ZEX\,G. 
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Let i E X be given. Clearly con d(z) c Y. If z E X;,,G, then &L) = @ SO that 
O(Z) $con d(c). If ZE G, then ZE G n cl,v GL. for some IE B so that 
d’,(z) = 4.~2) and hence d(z) c #.,(I). As t?(z) $ con d,(z), we must also have 
O(Z) $con d(z). Therefore, O(z) q! con d(z) for ail ;E X. Now we show that 
foreachpEY,~~‘(?‘)isopeninX.LetI,EXbesuchthat~-‘(~)#0and 
fix uE(‘(I’)= {zEX:1’E$b(-‘))= (2 E G : ,~*E&z)}; then there exists an 
open neighborhood M,, of u in G such that J.YE B : M, n GI, # 0) = 
(s(u, l), . . . . s(z4, n(u));. since (GI,) is a neighborhood-finite refinement. 
Note that for each s E B, if .Y 4 {x(u, l), . . . . X(U, n(u))}, then 0 = 
M,, n GI = M,, n cl, G: so that d:(z) = Y for all ZE M,. Thus we have 
d(z) = n TE B d:(z) = n:!JI d:,,, Jz) for all r E M,,. Note that 
ll(Ul 
ZEG:J’E (7 fj:,,,.i,(=) 
i= I 
But then ML = M,,n [fly!‘; (d’r,u,r, ) ’ (r’ )] is an open neighborhood of u 
in X such that MI c d-‘(y). This shows that for each .r E Y, &I(J) is open 
in X. Therefore, 4: X-+ 2’ is a correspondence of class 9:. It remains 
to show that P(~v) c d(w) for all tr E X. Indeed, let M* E X with P( it!) # 0. 
Note then M’ E G. For each x E B, if )V E G\cl, G: then &J IV) = Y 1 P( IV) 
and if IVE GnclX G:, we have LVEC~, G: c cl, G, c N, so that P(bv) c 
~.JM’) = q+‘Ji~). It follows that P( 1~) c d:( ~7) for all x E B so that P( M’) c 
flr.B &A~~,) = &LC). I 
Except for the difference in the definition of majorized correspondences, 
Lemma 1 is the same as [S, Proposition l] which, however, is stated 
without proof. 
We need the following simple result which is Lemma 1 in [2]: 
LEMMA 2. Let D be a non-empty compact subset of a topological vector 
space E. Then con D is a-compact and hence paracompact. 
We now prove the following theorem concerning the existence of a 
maximal element: 
409 I64 Z-14 
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THEOREM 1. Let X be a non-ernptll convex subset of a locally comex 
Hausdorff topological rjector space and D be a non-emnptj’ compact subset of 
X. Let P: X + 2 D be Y*-majorized (i.e., YT,-majorked). Then there exists 
a point .f E con D c X such that P(.<) = 0. 
Proof Suppose the contrary, i.e., for all .Y E con D, P(x) # 0. Then the 
set {.YE con D: P(s) # 0 ). = con D is paracompact by Lemma 2. By 
Lemma 1, there exists a correspondence 4: con D + 2” of class 04a* such 
that P(x) c 4(r) for each .YE con D. It is easy to see that C$ satisfies all 
hypotheses of [S, Theorem 5.33 and hence there exists a point .<-~con D 
such that &.<)= 0; it follows that P(.t) = 0 which contradicts our 
assumption. Hence, the conclusion must hold. 1 
Theorem 1 generalizes [7, Theorem 5.31 in the following. ways: (i) X 
need not be paracompact and (ii) P is Y*-majorized but need not be of 
class Y*. 
Applying Theorem 1, we prove the following equilibrium existence 
theorem for a l-person game: 
THEOREM 2. Let X be a non-emptjy convex subset of a locally com7e.v 
Hausdorff topological vector space and D be a non-empt>* compact subset of 
X. Let P: X+ 2O he Yip*-majorked (i.e., YcCmajorized) and *4, B : X + 2O 
be such that for each s E X, A(s) is non-empty and con .4(s) c B(x) and.for 
each J’ E D, A ~ I(>,) is open in X. If the correspondence cl B: X -+ 2 D is upper 
semicontjnuous, then there exists an equilibrium choice .< E X, i.e., .i- E cl B(.<) 
and .4(.t) n P(-<) = 0. 
Proqf: Let F= {.YE X: .YE cl B(x)}. We first note that F is closed in X 
since cl B is upper semicontinuous. Define $: X + 2O by 
A(s) n P(x), 
‘H-x)= a4(u) 
i . 
if .YE F, 
if .u$F. 
Ifs 4 F, then X\ F is an open neighborhood of s such that for each z E x‘;,, F, 
z $ cl B(z) and II/(=) = A(;); since con A(r) c B(z), we have z $ con A(i) and 
con A(r) c D. Since A-‘(~7) is open for all YE D, A is an Y*-majorant of 
$ at s. Now suppose that SE F and $(s) = A(s) n P(s) # 0; then by 
assumption there exist 4Y: X + 2O and an open neighborhood N, of .Y 
in X such that (a) P(z) cd,(;) and --#con ~Jz) for each ZEN,, 
(b)con~,(--)cDforeach=EXand(c)~.,’(I’)isopeninXforeach~ED. 
Define 4:: X+ ZD by 
then (i) for each -7 EN,, it is easy to see that I/(Z) c d:(z) and i $ con ~‘Jz), 
(ii) for each ZEX, con~:(r)ccon,4(Z)CB(~)cD and (iii)foreach LED, 
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(I:)-‘= [~.;‘(J)u (X’,,F)] n/‘(y) is open in X. This shows that 4: 
is an Y*-majorant of $ at x. Therefore, $ is Y*-majorized. By Theorem 1, 
there exists a point .t E X such that $(.E) = @. Since A(.r) # (ZI for each 
.uEX, we must have .<-~clB(.<) and I(/(.t)=A(.t)nP(.t)=@. 1 
4. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA FOR NON-COMPACT ABSTRACT ECONOMIES 
Let I be a (possibly infinite) set of agents. For each agent ie I, let its 
choice set or strategy set Xi be a non-empty set in a topological vector 
space. Let X= ni,, X,. If iE I, let xi: X-+ X, be the projection of X onto 
X, and for .YE X, let .Y, denote the projection z,(s) of .Y on X,. Let 
Pi: X + 2 ‘I be an irr<fle.uive preference correspondence, i.e., .Y, $ P,(s) for 
all SEX. Following [3], the collection (X,, Pl),t, will be called a 
qualitatice game. A point 1 E X is said to be an equilibrium of that game if 
Pi(.<)= 0 for all ill. For each iEZ, let z4i be a non-empty subset of X,; 
if in I is arbitrarily fixed, we define 
n .4,8/l,= {.K=(.Kk)kE, E X : xk E A, for each k E It-. 
i * s. I t I 
The following equilibrium existence theorem for a non-compact 
qualitative game is a consequence of Theorem 1. 
THEOREM 3. Let f = (Xi, P,),,, be a qualitative game such that .for each 
iE I, 
(a) X, is a non-empty* convex subset of a locall~~ corwes Hausdorif 
topological uector space, 
(b) P,: X=n,,,Xi-2DS is Y*-majorized (i.e., Yz;majorted), 
tchere Di is a non-empty compact subset qf X,, 
(c) the set E’= (.YEX: P,(s)#@) is open in X, 
(d) there exists a non-empty subset F, of Di such that Fin P,(s) # @ 
for each .K E E’ and con Fit Di. 
Then r has an equilibrium point, i.e., there exists a point 9 E X such that 
P,(.t) = 0 .for all iE I. 
Proqf: Let D= JJ,,, Di, then D is compact by Tychonoff’s theorem 
(e.g., see [S, p. 2241). For each .Y E X, let I(x) = {i E I : P,(x) # 0 )-. Define 
a correspondence P: X --* 2O by 
P(-y)= rEl(r.) 
i 
(-) p:(-~), if Z(.u) # 0, 
0. if I(.Y) = 0, 
where P;(x) = n,,i.i., F,@ P,(x) for each SEX. 
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Then for each XE X with Z(x) # 0, P(x) # 0. Let +YYE X be such that 
P(x) # 0. Then P;(x) # 0 for all in Z(.lc). Fix one in Z(.u). By assumption 
(b), there exist an open neighborhood N(.u) of I in X and an Y*-majorant 
#i of Pi at .Y such that 
(i) for each IEN( Pick, and ;i$con~i(~), 
(ii) for each r E X, con 4i(=) c Di, and 
(iii) for each J*E Di, 4;‘(y) is open in X. 
By assumption (c), we may assume N(s)c E’, so that Pi(z) #/zr for all 
-E N(x). Now we define @,: X + 2O by k 
@.Y(:)= fl FjO$i(z) for all :EX. 
i#i.lEI 
We now claim that @‘, is an Y*-majorant of P at s. Indeed, for each 
ZEN(X), by (i), 
P(L) = n P;(z) C P;(z) C Q.,(z) 
/E/f=) 
and 
2 $ con Q,(z). 
By assumption (d) and (ii), for each 2 E X, 
con Q,(r) c n con F,@con 4,(z) c D. 
;ti,fal 
Since for each .r E D, 
@.,I(,,)= d$'tFih 
- L 
if ~7~ E F, for all j # i, 
if I’,$ F, for some j # i 
and c$:‘(J;) is open in X, Q;‘(y) is also open in X. 
Therefore, @, is an Y*-majorant of P at s. This shows that P is 
6”*-majorized. By Theorem 1, there exists a point .<E X such that 
P(2) = 0 so that I(?) = Qr and hence P,(.f) = Qr for all in I. 1 
Remarks. (1) If Xi is compact convex for each iE Z, then the condition 
(d) in Theorem 3 is satisfied if D, = X, = Fi for each i E I. 
(2) Our Theorem 3 is an existence theorem of equilibrium for 
non-compact sets in locally convex spaces, while [4, p. 1011 Theorem 2.41 
is an existence theorem for compact sets in topological vector spaces. 
(3) The following condition clearly implies the condition (d) in 
Theorem 3 : con Pi(X) c Di for each i E I. 
Let Z be a (finite or an infinite) set of agents. An abstract economy 
r= txi, Ai7 Bi7 p,)isl is defined as a family of ordered quadruples 
(Xi, Ai, B,, P,), where Xi is a topological space, Ai: I-Iie, X, + 2K and 
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Bi: nj, I Xj + 2”’ are constraint correspondences and Pi: n,, t X, + 2.‘1 is 
a preference correspondence. An equilibrium for I- is a point 1 E X = 
nisi Xi such that for each icZ, .f;~cl B,(.E-) and Ai( P,(+f)=@. When 
A, = Bj for each i E I, our definitions of an abstract economy and an 
equilibrium coincide with the standard definitions; e.g., in [ 1, p. 3153 or in 
[7, p. 2421. 
As an application of Theorem 3, we prove the following existence 
theorem of equilibrium for a non-compact abstract economy with possibly 
an infinite number of agents. 
THEOREM 4. Let F= (Xi, Ai, Bi, Pi),,, be an abstract econom)l such that 
for each i E I, 
(a) X, is a non-emptjv conrex subset of a locally comes Hausdorff 
topological eector space, 
(b) .foreack.uEX=n,.,X,, A,(x)isnon-empt~andconAj(.u)cB,(,~). 
(c) for each y E Xi, 4,: ‘(~7) is open in X, 
(d) the correspondence cl B;: X + ZDi is upper semicontinuous, bchere 
D, is a non-empt)* compact subset of Xi, 
(e) .4,n P, is 9’*-majorized, 
(f) thesefE’=(.yEX:(A,nP,)(x)#@)isopeninX, 
(g ) there exists a non-empty* subset K, of Di with con K, c Di such that 
f 01 each sgE’nF,, (A;nP,)(x)nK,#@ and for each xeX\F,, 
conA,(x)nK,#@, bvhere F,= {.~EX:.Y~EC~ B,(x)). 
Then F has an equilibrium point, i.e., there exists a point i E X such that 
.~;EcI B;(.t) and A,(i)n Pi(.<)=O.for each iel. 
Proof. For each iE Z, as cl Bi is upper semicontinuous, the set F, is 
closed in X. We now define Q,: X -+ 2Dz by 
Qi(.r, = 
1 
(Ain pi)(-“)9 if xgF,, 
con Ai( if x#Fi. 
We shall show that the qualitative game f = (Xi, Qi)iE, satisfies the 




= (X\F;) u E’ 
is open in X by (f). 
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Let s E X be such that Qi(x) # 0. We consider the following two cases: 
Case 1. s$ F,. 
Let @\- = con A, and N,. = x\ F,, then N-, is an open neighborhood of .Y 
in X such that 
(*I Qi(z)c Q’,(Z) and by (b), zi$con @J,(Z) for each IE N.,, 
(**I con G.,(Z) c Di for each z E X by (b), 
( ***) @;‘(.I*) is open in X for all J,ED~ by (c) and [7, p.239, 
Lemma 5.11. 
Therefore, @, is an Y*-majorant of Qi at s. 
Case 2. s E F,. 
Since Qi(s) = (A, n P,)(X) # 0 and Ai n P, is 4P*-majorized, there exist 
an open neighborhood N, of I in X and a correspondence dI: X + 20Z such 
that (Ai n P,)(z) c q4J~) and zi # con 4-J;) for each ZEN,, con d,.(z) c D, 
for each ;EXand d.;‘(.~) is open in Xfor each J’ED,. Define @,:X+2D1 
by 
Q,(z) = 
con A,(z)ntj,(z), if ZEF,, 
con A,(z), if z$F,. 
Note that as (A,n Pj)(z)~~.Jz) for each ZEN,, we have Qi(z) c G,(Z) 
and con Q,(Z) c D, for each ZEN,. It is easy to see that ;;$con Q,(Z) for 
all z E N,. Moreover, for any J E Di, the set 
(@,)-I (y)= {,-EX:J’E@.,(2)) 
is open in X. Therefore, G-r is an .P*-majorant of Qi at x. 
Therefore, Qi is an dP*-majorized correspondence. Let XE X with 
Qj(z)#O. Then .u~(x\F,)u {x’EF~: (AinP,)(s’)#O}. If XEX:.F,, 
then by assumption (g) we have 0 #con A,(x)n K,= pi(x) n K,. If 
XE {X’E Fi : (Ain P,)(d) # a}, then by assumption (g) again, 0 # 
(Ain P,)(x)n Ki= Qi(x)n Ki. Therefore, we have Q;(.u)n K,#/21 in both 
cases. Also we have con K, c D,. 
Therefore, all hypotheses of Theorem 3 are satisfied, so that there exists 
a point i.~ X such that Qi(,t) = 0 for all iE I. By (b), this implies that for 
each iEZ, .Ci~clBi(.C) and A,(i)nP,(.t)=@. [ 
EQUILIBRIA OF GENERALIZED GAMES 517 
Remarks. ( 1) If Xi is compact convex for each i E I, then the condition 
(g) in Theorem 4 is satisfied if Xi= Dj= Ki for each ill. 
(2) Theorem 4 generalizes [7, p. 242, Theorem 6.11 in several ways: 
(a) A’, need not be compact or metrizable, (b) Pi need not be of class 9, 
and (c) the set I of agents need not be countable. 
In case Xi is compact convex and A i = Bi for each i E I, then we have the 
following immediate consequence of Theorem 4: 
COROLLARY. Let I-=(X,. A,, P,),,, he an abstract economy* such that 
for each i E I, 
(a) X, is a non-empt)’ compact convex subset of a Iocall~~ cont’ex 
Hausdorff topological Oector space, 
(b) jar each SEX=~,~, X,, A;(x) is non-empt!’ conue.v, 
(c) jbr each JEX~, A,‘(J’) is open in X, 
(d) the correspondence cl Ai: X + 2°C is upper semicontinuous, 
(e) Ajn P, is Y*-mqjorized, 
(f) theset (xEX:(A,~P,)(.Y)#@} isopeninX. 
Then r has an equilibrium. 
Remark. The above corollary is closely related to [6, p. 283, 
Theorem 4; 4, pp. 102-103, Theorem 2.51; their results are existence 
theorems of equilibria for compact abstract economies under a stronger 
assumption (namely, s, 4 con P,(s j for all .Y E X) than our corollary (and 
hence also Theorem 4) but their underlying spaces are only topological 
vector spaces (while ours are locally convex Hausdorff topological vector 
spaces ). 
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